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Abstract
From the end of the Great War to the onset of the Second World War, Great
Britain and British India clashed over the Indian Army’s role in imperial defence.
Britain increasingly sought an imperial fighting force that it could deploy across
the globe, but the government of India, limited by the growing independence
movements, financial constraints, and—particularly—renewed tribal unrest on
its North-West Frontier, refused to meet these demands. Attempts to reconcile
Britain’s and India’s conflicting strategies made little headway until the late
1930s when compromise ultimately emerged with the establishment of the
Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39. While the Committee
refuted India’s traditional focus on the subcontinent’s own security, importantly
it recognized the necessity of British financial support for the Indian Army and
the maintenance of a large local fighting force to prevent North-West Frontier
unrest from disrupting imperial military planning at a time of global war.
Introduction
In the interwar years, Great Britain and British India struggled to
compromise over the responsibilities of the Indian Army. Although
Britain hoped to station Indian forces throughout the empire, India
refused. Limited by financial constraints and increasingly powerful
Indian nationalists, British India instead focused on the security of its
own borders and internal peacekeeping. India remained determinedly
aloof from British military strategies that would have required the
deployment of Indian troops across the Far and Middle East, although
it slowly started deploying troops abroad as the British—equally
reluctantly—agreed to provide financial support in return. These
small developments early in the 1930s still left the bulk of Indian
1
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troops available to subdue the subcontinent’s restless North-West
Frontier, which erupted into rebellion in 1936 when various Pathan
tribesmen in the federally governed tribal zone were inspired to take
up arms by a militant religious leader, the Faqir of Ipi. The region
required constant military vigilance for years after the revolt, as tribes
continued to test colonial rule.
In the years spanning the frontier rebellion to the outbreak of the
Second World War in September 1939, policy makers in India and
Britain alike found the North-West Frontier a source of frustration
and provocation, and they consequently invested considerable time
and effort in creating alternative political and military strategies for
subduing the region. Peace on the North-West Frontier became even
more vital when it became apparent that a world war was looming.
The British demanded that India change its military policies and
accept imperial commitments, subsidizing Britain’s own weak army
and subduing unrest throughout the empire.
Studies of the growing tensions between the ‘continental
commitment’ and imperial defence during the interwar years
represent a large body of historiography and scholars have widely
considered the preparations undertaken to ready the empire’s armies
for war.1 The Indian Army has attracted particular attention because
of its considerable size and its uneasy role in the changing landscape
of Indian nationalist politics and imperial decline.2 Scholars have
recognized that the government of India, like that in Britain,
resisted committing its troops to the defence of the empire; instead,
the subcontinent’s own security preoccupied India’s military during
the interwar years. Historians have been slower to recognize the
significance and correlations of ongoing struggles on India’s North-
West Frontier with the wider debates about the future of military
policy taking place in both India and Great Britain. The issue of the
frontier and India’s local defences arose in numerous policy-making
debates as the Second World War approached, ultimately requiring
1 See Barnett, C. (1974). Britain and her army, 1509–1970, Penguin, London; Bond,
B. (1980). Military policy between the two world wars, Clarendon Press, Oxford; Howard,
M. (1972). The continental commitment: The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of
the two world wars, Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., London; and Peden, G.C. (1984).
‘The burden of imperial defence and the continental commitment reconsidered’, The
Historical Journal, 27:2, pp. 405–23.
2 See Heathcote, T.A. (1995). The military in British India, Manchester University
Press, Manchester, and Tomlinson, B.R. (1979). The political economy of the Raj 1914–
1947, Macmillan, London.
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the establishment of several committees to attempt to reconcile the
Indian Army’s deployment on the frontier with imperial demands
abroad.
The Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39
built upon the findings of previous commissions to provide policy
recommendations for the Indian Army’s deployment along the Indo-
Afghan border and abroad at a time of global crisis. The Expert
Committee sought a compromise between military intervention on the
frontier and the provision of Indian troops for the imperial war effort.
It ultimately succeeded in enacting a revision of traditional Indian
military policy, for the first time fully incorporating the subcontinent
into imperial defence and making provisions for the deployment
of Indian soldiers throughout the empire. At the same time, the
Committee recognized the enduring obligations towards the North-
West Frontier, garrisoning a huge body of troops there, despite the
growing threat of global war. Throughout the interwar years, the
Expert Committee on the Defence of India proved to be the most
successful in balancing India’s local military requirements with its
ability to send troops abroad, drawing India into a global defence
system just at the moment when Britain faced one of the greatest
threats to its isles and its empire.
The Indian Army and imperial defence, 1919–1933
The peace conferences following the First World War led to the
expansion of the British empire into the Middle East, including
informal control of the vital oilfields in Iran and Iraq. As Britain
struggled to police its extended empire with a severely diminished
British Army, officials in London turned to the Indian Army as the
single greatest ready fighting force in the empire. Traditionally the
Indian Army had only been responsible for maintaining peace on
the subcontinent, particularly on the North-West Frontier where
three Anglo-Afghan wars (the most recent in 1919), fears of Russian
expansion, and constant unrest among the tribes necessitated a
vigilant army garrison. However, the Army’s duties had expanded
with the outbreak of the First World War when more than 700,000
Indian personnel took part in the British war effort.3
3 Heathcote, The military in British India, p. 24.
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Faced with rebellion in Egypt, unrest in Iraq, and fears of Russian
and Turkish interest in the oilfields, British policy makers immediately
deployed Indian troops to the Middle East. India protested at this
additional cost, however, as it was burdened with more than 200
crores of rupees of wartime debt as well as by unrest against increased
taxation in the subcontinent.4 In response, the 1919 Government of
India Act decreed that the primary purpose of the Indian Army was
the defence of the subcontinent, not the empire, leading to a recall of
Indian troops.5 The Act did little to deter British policy makers who
argued that overstretched British forces could not maintain peace in
the region and must be withdrawn and replaced by Indian troops.
The British government demanded an additional 39.5 Indian infantry
and pioneer battalions supported by cavalry, sappers, miners, and
signallers to deploy to Iraq, sparking an uproar within the government
of India, which refused to spend 40 per cent of India’s net revenue on
imperial policing.6 Despite the protests by the viceroy, a new Army in
India Committee, appointed by the British government, went ahead
with an examination of the Indian Army’s role in imperial defence.
The Esher Committee, as it was known, lauded the future deployment
of the Indian Army for imperial defence, proposing that the Army’s
reorganization and modernization would ‘secure that the government
of India will have at its disposal a well-trained and loyal army, fit to
take its share in the defence of the Empire’.7 At the same time, the
Committee recognized that its proposals would increase the annual
cost of the army beyond even its huge wartime cost.8
Just as Great Britain severely reduced military expenditures
after the First World War, so was the government of India also
determined to slash its army budget. Indian defence expenditures
had swelled by nearly 300 per cent during the First World War and
the Esher Committee’s proposal for a further budget increase was
unacceptable.9 The crisis caused by the Esher Committee resulted in
4 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, pp. 108–10. A ‘crore’ equals 10 million
rupees.
5 Jeffery, K. (1984). The British Army and the crisis of empire 1918–1922, Manchester
University Press, Manchester, p. 57.
6 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, pp. 114–15.
7 ‘Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to enquire
into the administration and organisation of the Army in India’, 22 June 1920, Public
Records Office, Kew (PRO), CAB 24/112.
8 Ibid.
9 Bose, S. and Jalal, A. (1998). Modern South Asia: History, culture, political economy,
Routledge, New York, p. 127.
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a new study of the Indian Army by a Committee of Imperial Defence
sub-committee, which eventually concluded that the Indian Army’s
main responsibility remained the subcontinent, not the empire.10 As
the furore over the future of Indian military deployment died down,
the government of India refocused on reducing its defence spending. In
1925 alone, policy makers curtailed India’s military budget from £61.5
million to £42 million with consequent cuts to the army’s numbers:
the size of the Indian Army dropped from 159,000 to 140,000 men
and another 18,000 British troops left the subcontinent.11
The Indian subcontinent remained fairly quiet throughout the
1920s and early 1930s, despite fears of a Soviet invasion and renewed
Anglo-Afghan tensions, but abroad, Britain faced imperial competition
and growing threats in Europe. Great powers had begun forming
rival empires: Italy had overrun Ethiopia and Libya, while Japan
had annexed part of Manchuria, established the puppet kingdom of
Manchukuo, and invaded China. Within the British empire, a massive
revolt in Palestine and pan-Arab tensions throughout the Middle East
led the British to seek various settlements.12 Britain came to an uneasy
compromise with Egypt, recognizing its independence in 1936, but
maintaining a British garrison in the Suez Canal zone and a 20-year
military alliance.13
In Great Britain, policy makers hesitated in deploying the British
Army—even after signing the Locarno Treaty in 1925, planners
baulked at expanding or modernizing Britain’s armed forces for fear
of another continental conflict.14 Policy makers adhered closely to
the ‘Ten Year Rule’ established by Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary for
the Committee of Imperial Defence, which assumed ‘that the British
Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten
years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose.
[. . .] The principal functions of the Military and Air Forces is to provide
10 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 116.
11 Mason, P. (1974). A matter of honour: An account of the Indian Army, its officers and men,
Jonathan Cape, London, p. 456.
12 See Krämer, G. (2008). A history of Palestine: From the Ottoman conquest to the founding
of the state of Israel, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Tripp, C. (2000). A history
of Iraq, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Fieldhouse, D.K. (2006). Western
imperialism in the Middle East 1914–1958, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Beasley,
W.G. (1987). Japanese imperialism 1894–1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
13 Kolinsky, M. (1999). Britain’s war in the Middle East: Strategy and diplomacy, 1936–
42, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 30–31.
14 Bond, British military policy between the two world wars, pp. 75–80.
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garrisons for India, Egypt, the new mandated territory and all territory
(other than self-governing) under British control.’15
Constrained by a weak British Army but nevertheless requiring
forces to quell unrest throughout the empire, military officials turned
to the Indian Army as a tool of imperial defence. The Garran Tribunal
in 1933 proposed to circumvent the 1919 Act by providing an annual
£1.5 million to the government of India in return for maintaining
an ‘Imperial Reserve’.16 The enquiry calculated that this sum would
‘relieve the Indian taxpayer of the cost of some ten British Infantry
battalions’.17 Policy makers in London also proposed to withdraw
additional British troops from the Indian Army to serve elsewhere
in the empire, citing the Indianization of the officer corps as a
measure that would replace British officers leaving the subcontinent.18
Indianization itself, which the government had adopted in the last
months of the First World War, gained favour as an additional means
of decreasing the Army’s costs. As one official noted, ‘[t]he general
attitude of the India Office has been that in any case the new type of
Indian officer should no longer be given the Indian Army allowance
or overseas element of pay, and that if a new and lower scale can be
devised which will attract the right type of candidate and enable him
to maintain a reasonable standard of life as an officer it will be all to
the good’.19
The Tribunal’s compromises provided immediate relief for India’s
strained defence budget as well as for British military forces needing
reinforcement for imperial policing across the world; in broader terms,
the numbers of Indian forces offered were minimal. However, little
further action could be taken while British administrators in India
were preoccupied by the growing Indian independence movement and
the emergence of new threats on the subcontinent’s volatile North-
West Frontier.
15 War Cabinet conclusions, 15 August 1919, PRO, CAB 23/15.
16 Heathcote, The military in British India, p. 243.
17 Press communiqué, 20 December 1933, India Office Records, London (IOR),
L/Mil/7/5508.
18 Ibid.; Bond, British military policy between the two world wars, pp. 111–12.
19 Letter from Sir Findlater Steward to A.P. Waterfield, 14 July 1931, IOR,
L/Mil/5/885. For more on Indianization, see Gupta, P.S. (2002). ‘The debate on
Indianization 1918–39’, in Gupta, P.S., and Deshpande, A. The British Raj and its
Indian armed forces 1857–1939, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 228–69.
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Internal restrictions: Indian nationalism and the
North-West Frontier
Though lesser agreements had been reached between the British and
Indian administrations, which allowed for restricted deployment of
the Indian Army abroad, officials had to address a number of limiting
factors within the Indian subcontinent before further negotiations
could take place. Indian nationalist forces had undergone extensive
transformation since the end of the First World War and British
policy makers could no longer make decisions without considering the
influential independence movements. At the same time, a resurgence
of violence on India’s North-West Frontier refocused military planners
on the necessity of quelling the Pathan tribesmen of the borderlands:
before the Indian Army could be deployed abroad, it had to secure
India’s own perimeters.
Indian nationalists from various parties, particularly the Liberals
and Swarajists, focused on the Indianization of the army as the
means to extend local influence on the imperial force.20 This trend
began during the Great War with the appointment of some of
the first Indian officers, and British administrators agreed to the
expansion of Indian officer commissions in eight units in 1923 before
advancing Indian admissions at Sandhurst, Woolwich, and Cranwell,
and establishing the Royal Indian Air Force.21 At the First Round
Table Conference in 1931, British officials finally established the
Indian Military Academy.22 Even as efforts to Indianize the armed
forces continued throughout the interwar years, Indian politicians
remained uneasy about the large costs of the military; the military
budget remained a major bone of contention between Indian political
representatives and British officials.23
Political developments gave Indian politicians additional sway in
influencing whether the Indian Army was integrated into imperial
defence schemes. After the Great War, the Indian National Congress
dominated the movement for Indian independence, while its main
rival, and sometime ally, the Muslim League, largely lay in abeyance
until Muhammad Ali Jinnah revived the organization in 1934.24
20 Gupta, ‘The debate on Indianization’, p. 238.
21 Unsigned document, ‘Indianization’, undated, IOR, L/Mil/7/5465.
22 Press communiqué, 20 December 1933, IOR, L/Mil/7/5508.
23 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 118.
24 Jalal, A. (1985). The sole spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for
Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 7–13. For more on growing
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Congress and League agitations ultimately led the British to pass
the 1935 Government of India Act, granting provincial autonomy
and creating a new council of state and a revised, elected federal
legislature. In the subsequent 1937 elections, the Congress won
decisive victories in many provinces, while the Muslim League faced
defeat even in those regions where Muslims comprised the majority.
Increasingly restricted by representatives in the legislative
assembly, British administrators in India could provide only minimal
guarantees for imperial defence abroad, and security concerns
on India’s North-West Frontier created an even more immediate
limitation. Restless Pathan tribesmen and the permeability of the
Durand Line kept the region in a state of constant flux as violence
on either side of the border broke out time and again. For decades,
policy makers had tried to find ways to subdue local tribesmen; they
debated adopting a ‘forward’ policy towards the North-West Frontier,
which would bring the region directly under colonial rule, or adopting
a ‘closed border’, which would leave the tribes to their own governance.
Policy makers such as Olaf Caroe, who served as a political agent
on the frontier before becoming penultimate governor of the North-
West Frontier Province, emphasized the difficulties of attempting to
integrate tribesmen into Indian provincial governance but also warned
of the strategic dangers of leaving the tribes to their own devices.25
Even after the fall of tsarist Russia, military strategists still discussed
the potential continuation of the Great Game. The Blue Plan of 1927,
the Defence of India Plan of 1928–29, and the Pink Plan of 1931
worked on the assumption that a great power—typically the Soviet
Union—would attack Afghanistan and subsequently the North-West
Frontier.26 Nevertheless administrators failed to agree on a specific
tribal policy and instead relied on existing military garrisons and
attempts to integrate the tribes economically into the subcontinent
through efforts such as road building.
tensions between India’s Hindu and Muslim communities, see also Page, D. (1982).
Prelude to partition: The Indian Muslims and the imperial system of control 1920–1932, Oxford
University Press, New Delhi.
25 See Brobst, P.J. (2005). The future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s
independence, and the defense of Asia, University of Akron Press, Akron, Ohio, particularly
pp. 101–03.
26 Prasad, B. (1963). Defence of India: Policy and plans, Official history of the Indian Armed
Forces in the Second World War 1939–45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section,
Calcutta, pp. 28–31.
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Military patrols in the two years following the 1919 Anglo-Afghan
war had suppressed local Pathan tribesmen, but left them restless.
Nevertheless, besides smaller disturbances among the Mahsud and
Afridi Pathans in 1930, 1933, and 1935, which the Indian Army
quickly subdued, the frontier remained essentially peaceful.27 After
this period of quiescence, however, in 1936 a rebellion broke out in
the federally governed tribal zone on the frontier, led by the militant
Faqir of Ipi. The revolt gained military significance as the rebelling
force grew to some 5,000 to 7,000 Wazir Pathan tribesmen who
took part in attacks against the British, aided by Afghan tribesmen
who crossed India’s border to support their religious brethren.28
In turn, the British deployed the Royal Air Force and mechanized
tank companies to support 61,000 personnel in military and road-
building operations.29 Only the Arab Revolt—where Britain deployed
14 battalions to Palestine—could compare for sheer size.30 Moreover,
the huge cost of operations on the North-West Frontier was impressive:
by August 1937 the campaign consumed one lakh of rupees per
day.31 By October the total cost of operations had reached 160 lakhs,
approximately £1,200,000.32 Besides the fighting in Palestine, the
rebellion on the North-West Frontier was the only major obstacle to
broader imperial peace, and for this reason, the Waziristan campaign
become one of the largest military engagements of the interwar years.
While official histories and accounts of the 1936–37 rebellion in
Waziristan suggested it ended with the close of 1937, in reality a brief
lull in fighting quickly gave way to clashes in March 1938 as a Congress
ministry was established in the North-West Frontier Province and the
Faqir of Ipi continued to encourage armed resistance.33 The British
27 Caroe, O. (1962). The Pathans 550 B.C.–A.D. 1957, Macmillan, London, p. 397;
Elliott, J.G. (1969). The frontier, 1839–1947, Cassell & Co., London, p. 178.
28 Warren, A. (2000). Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North-West
Frontier revolt of 1936–37, Oxford University Press, Karachi, p. 279; Supplement no. 2
to monthly intelligence summary no. 7 on events in Waziristan, 20 July 1937, IOR,
L/Mil/5/1065.
29 Moreman, T.R. (1998). The Army in India and the development of frontier warfare,
1849–1947, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 163–67.
30 Kolinsky, Britain’s war in the Middle East, p. 67.
31 ‘Frontier operations cost about rs. one lakh a day’, The (Lahore) Tribune, LVII (25
August 1937), p. 16. A ‘lakh’ equals 100,000 rupees.
32 ‘N.-W. frontier fighting. British casualties. Total cost of campaign’, The (London)
Times, no. 47847 (20 November 1937), p. 11.
33 In the North-West Frontier Province, the Congress established a ministry with
the aid of their allies, the Khudai Khidmatgars, a Pathan nationalist organization
based in the settled districts. While the Khudai Khidmatgars, or ‘Red Shirts’ as they
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worried about the effects of the Congress’s victory, particularly on
the Indo-Afghan tribesmen. Sir James Grigg, finance member of
the Viceroy’s Executive Council, considered the implications of the
Congress’s victory for peace on the North-West Frontier: ‘[a]re we
[sic] in the process of divesting ourselves of real power and, if so, in
favour of whom? If our policy can be represented as working towards
Hindu Raj then nothing we can do now will keep the Frontier quiet or
induce Afghanistan to help us in doing so.’34
The effects of nationalist agitations on the North-West Frontier
acquired new dimensions as tribal unrest resumed, targeting Hindu
civilians in the Province’s settled districts. Tribesmen planted
homemade bombs along roads and raided the Province’s settled
regions, particularly Bannu District, where they kidnapped numerous
Hindu civilians. On 27 May 1938 more than 1,000 tribesmen
converged on the Datta Khel Lowargi area where they attacked two
Frontier Scouts posts. In response, the British launched air attacks
against the Madda Khel Wazirs, the tribesmen largely responsible for
hostilities and who had refused to expel the Faqir of Ipi from their
lands.35 Unrest continued through to the end of 1939, with sniping
and raids on district settlements frequently occurring.
The British tried unsuccessfully to suppress the tribes, initiating a
five-day campaign by columns in the Ahmedzai Salient north of Bannu
at the end of September 1938, column action in South Waziristan
in December, and an operation in the Khaisora Valley in North
Waziristan in February 1939. The Royal Air Force acted throughout to
support troops and also took independent action against tribesmen.36
Nevertheless, tribal lashkars, or war parties, continued their attacks
and the Faqir of Ipi remained free. Governor George Cunningham
were popularly known, based their movement on Pathan tribal law and traditions,
they only minimally influenced the Pathans of the tribal zone. The British limited
the Red Shirts’ access to the tribal zone, leaving the organization to develop almost
entirely in the settled districts. See Banerjee, M. (2000). The Pathan unarmed: Opposition
& memory in the North West Frontier, James Currey, Oxford.
34 Sir James Grigg to Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, 29 October 1938, Churchill College
Archives Centre, Cambridge (CCAC), Grigg Papers, PJGG 4/4/1.
35 See ‘Appreciation of the political situation by the Government of India’, 21
January 1938, PRO, CAB 24/274; Ibid., 23 February 1938, PRO, CAB 24/275; Ibid.,
20 March 1938, PRO, CAB 24/276; Ibid., 21 April 1938, PRO, CAB 24/276; Ibid.,
21 May 1938, PRO, CAB 24/276; Ibid., 20 June 1938, PRO, CAB 24/277.
36 ‘Appreciation of the political situation by the Government of India’, 24 October
1938, PRO, CAB 24/279; Ibid., 18 January 1939, PRO, CAB 24/283; Ibid., 1 March
1939, PRO, CAB 24/284.
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of the North-West Frontier Province lamented to the viceroy, Lord
Linlithgow, that ‘the possibility of achieving any finality is remote so
long as Ipi can take refuge over the Durand Line and secure assistance
in men and supplies from Afghanistan’.37
At the same time, the threat of Axis infiltration had seeped into
the subcontinent, creating new concerns among government officials
about the security of the frontier. A second popular Muslim insurgent,
the Shami Pir, appeared on the North-West Frontier in 1938; after he
began advocating that the frontier Pathans fight to return the deposed
king, Amanullah, to the Afghan throne, the government of India
threatened to launch a new air campaign before ultimately bribing him
to move to Syria.38 Some officials suspected the Shami Pir of working
for the Axis powers, though no evidence ever supported this belief.
As war loomed, however, the government of India understandably
grew wary of any potential Axis designs: during the First World War,
German nationals in Kabul had tried to foster tribal revolts against
the Raj. By June 1939, members of the Italian Legation in Kabul had
contacted the Faqir of Ipi with similar ambitions.39
As a consequence of ongoing struggles and growing fears about the
frontier—as well as public outcries against civilian bombings—the
government of India commenced new discussions of frontier political
and military policy. Officials proposed various strategies for subduing
the frontier, ranging between the ‘close border’ and ‘forward’ policies.
The close border policy traditionally required British governance of
the frontier’s settled districts and only limited punitive expeditions
into the tribal areas, while the forward policy entailed the almost
complete occupation of tribal territory. Early in the interwar years, the
British had embraced a ‘half forward’ policy, stationing troops in posts
throughout the tribal areas without pushing for total settlement.40
37 Fortnightly report from North-West Frontier Province Governor to Viceroy, 23
July 1938, IOR, Linlithgow Papers, Mss Eur F125.
38 ‘Appreciation of the political situation by the Government of India’, 22 July
1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.
39 Hauner, M. (1981). ‘One man against the empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the
British in Central Asia on the eve of and during the Second World War’, Journal of
Contemporary History, 16:1, p. 185, pp. 192–99. See also Hauner, M. (1981). India in
Axis strategy: Germany, Japan and Indian nationalists in the Second World War, Klett-Cotta,
Stuttgart.
40 Memorandum prepared by the Air Staff and given to Sir Thomas Inskip by Sir
Kingsley Wood, ‘Policy and control of the North West Frontier of India’, 22 November
1938, IOR, L/Mil/7/5465.
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The presence of the Indian Army along the Indo-Afghan border
sparked various debates. Despite public outrage against aerial
bombardment, the Air Staff, dismissing the half forward policy,
recommended the withdrawal of land forces from the region and their
replacement by the air force: ‘[i]f we can carry out a major withdrawal
under the sanction of air forces there is no normal tribal situation that
air forces cannot solve with ease’.41 A proposal to replace the Indian
Army regionally with irregular troops and frontier scouts also sparked
debate. Cunningham lauded the gradual removal of the regular army,
telling the viceroy, ‘the embarrassment in the present position is that
we maintain a large Military force in a potentially hostile country,
while at the same time seldom, if ever, is any really adequate Military
objective offered’.42 In contrast, R.A. Cassels, the commander-in-
chief, questioned the advisability of withdrawing troops, demanding
‘[a]part from other considerations, what are the political effects of this
withdrawal so far as Afghanistan and the tribes, not only in Waziristan
but on the whole Frontier, likely to be? I cannot help thinking [sic]
the certain effect in the minds of our tribesmen and of those across
the Afghan border will be that our control is definitely weakening’.
Instead, Cassels recommended the ‘total or partial disarmament’ of
the tribal zone.43
The viceroy took a personal interest in the frontier’s future,
presenting a memorandum on border policy on 29 June 1939. He
first considered previous changes in frontier policy, which in 1936 had
resulted in the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs telling the Afghan
minister in London that the British government meant to ‘preserve
the peace of the border, foster good relations with the tribes, and
gradually to introduce standards of civilization and order into the tribal
area together with the improvement of their economic conditions’ by
peaceful means, though by force ‘when it is necessary to do so’.44 After
summarizing events since the 1936–37 revolt, Linlithgow ultimately
concluded that the 1936 policy should remain in place without any
drastic changes. Despite continued border clashes, he argued that
frontier operations had been ‘generally successful, save perhaps on
41 Ibid.
42 G. Cunningham, ‘Note on His Excellency the Viceroy’s memorandum on frontier
policy dated 29th June, 1939’, 5 July 1939, IOR, L/PO/5/32.
43 Further notes on Viceroy’s memorandum from R.A. Cassels to the Marquess of
Linlithgow, 10 July 1939, IOR, L/PO/5/32.
44 Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on frontier policy, 29 June 1939,
IOR, L/PO/5/32.
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the economic and civilizing side [sic]. Nor is there any alternative
method of securing our objectives which would appear to be less open
to objection than the existing policy’.45
Linlithgow’s memorandum did not serve as the final word on frontier
policy; government of India officials continued to call for further
consideration of the military’s role in the region and the future of
the North-West Frontier within a self-governed India. Caroe, deputy
secretary to the government of India’s Foreign Department, remarked
‘[t]hinking Indians, both Hindu and Muslim, have frequently told
me of their objection to the mystery with which frontier affairs are
shrouded. It is no longer possible to work in the dark in the tribal
areas, and I would suggest freer and fuller discussion of these matters
in Assemblies and political circles, whether at the centre or in the
North-West Frontier Province’.46
In London, men who had served in the region continued the debate.
The former North-West Frontier Province governor, Lieutenant-
Colonel Sir R. Griffith, resignedly concluded that ‘so long as numbers
[of tribesmen] are hungry and possess arms and irresponsible freedom
to use them as they will, we must expect periodic outbreaks, and can
at best look for slow progress only’.47 Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Bruce
informed the East India Association that the close border policy had
resulted in systemic failure and ‘it was by the exercise of a just and
civilizing control that Britain could secure safety of life and the sorely-
needed development of the tribal country’.48 At the same meeting,
Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode called for economic development
of the tribal area, while Sir William Barton, who had also served in the
region, bemoaned ‘[w]hat a vast difference it would make if we could
feel that a million fighting men of the frontier were on our side in the
next war’.49
As officials continued to debate, some changes went into effect on
the frontier. On 10 April 1939 political control of Waziristan shifted
45 Ibid.
46 Memorandum responding to memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on
frontier policy from O. Caroe, 8 July 1939, IOR, L/PO/5/32.
47 Griffith, R. (1938). ‘The frontier policy of the Government of India’, Journal of
the Royal United Services Institute, 83:531, p. 577.
48 ‘Pacification of N.-W. Frontier. Mistakes in method’, The Times, no. 48307 (17
May 1939), p. 20.
49 Ibid.; see also Chetwode, P. (1936). ‘Proceedings of the East India Association.
Some aspects of the defence of India. Now and when the reforms materialize’, The
Asiatic Review, 32:109, pp. 463–78.
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from the general officer commanding-in-chief, Northern Command,
to the civilian North-West Frontier Province governor, but tribal
incursions into the settled districts continued on an almost daily
basis as did attacks on soldiers, necessitating a continued military
presence. Lashkars still planted bombs on roads to Razmak and between
Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan and raided properties near Bannu,
kidnapping and killing villagers and sniping at troops along roads and
in encampments.50 Frontier policy thus had little more definition by
September 1939 than it had had at the end of the 1936–37 revolt. The
need to address regional upheaval acquired new urgency, however, as
policy makers in London demanded that the frontier should no longer
drain India’s military resources and that instead the Indian Army
should fight abroad.
Great Britain, the Indian Army, and military reform
While government of India officials struggled to develop a policy for
eliminating North-West Frontier unrest, thereby limiting its local
military expenditures, officials in London considered the region in the
context of national and international defence. Strategists traditionally
had seen the North-West Frontier as India’s most likely point of
invasion by a foreign power and they had created plans for India’s
defence accordingly. But the dwindling Soviet threat in the 1930s
and the approach of war between European powers led policy makers
to reconsider the role of the Indian Army in imperial strategy,
particularly its deployment along the Indo-Afghan border in a time
of international conflict.
Great Britain, by this time, had realized that it was desperately ill-
prepared to fight a major war, particularly one taking place on land.
In Britain’s own forces, the ‘Ten Year Rule’ and the government’s
preference for a policy of ‘limited liability’ meant that Great Britain
had forestalled modernizing its army in the years after the First
World War and those changes that had taken place had prepared
50 For examples see ‘Tribesmen kidnap three women and one man. Village party
gives them fight. Two persons rescued’, The Tribune, LIX (24 June 1939), p. 3; ‘Cavalry
lines in Bannu fired on’, The Tribune, LIX (30 June 1939), p. 3; ‘Tribal raids in Bannu,
D.I. Khan’, The Tribune, LIX (8 July 1939), p. 3; ‘Bombs explode on Razmak road.
One man injured’, The Tribune, LIX (22 July 1939), p. 16; ‘Razmak camp sniped. No
casualties. Bridges damaged; lorries detained’, The Tribune, LIX (10 August 1939),
p. 7.
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Britain’s armed forces for imperial deployment, not a conflict against
a highly mechanized, modernized European foe. As early as 1932,
the Committee of Imperial Defence Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee
acknowledged that British military policy had resulted in ‘a terrible
deficiency in essential requirements for all three Defence Services and
a consequential inability to fulfil our major commitments[,] the decay
of our armaments industry [and] a state of ineffectiveness unequalled
in the defensive arrangements of any foreign military Power’.51
In 1934 the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee called for a ‘five
year deficiency programme’ to modernize Britain’s Navy, Army, and
Air force. The Committee believed that Britain’s land forces should
be organized into four modern, mechanized divisions supported by
a tank brigade and a cavalry division which could be mustered at a
month’s notice.52 Even with these proposed changes, the British Army
suffered neglect in comparison to the other services: in 1934 alone,
policy makers allocated only £6.9 million in rearmament spending
to the Army while they gave £20.9 million to the Royal Navy and
£9.4 million to the Royal Air Force.53 Policy makers still identified
imperial defence as the Army’s main duty, while the Air force and
Navy shared responsibility for Britain’s own security. As late as 1938
Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha maintained that British
troops would fight in Europe only if ‘the situation in the rest of the
world permits’.54 Policy makers consequently split the British Army’s
budget between anti-aircraft defences and building up the field forces,
further minimizing the military’s development.55
Finances inevitably served as one of the greatest limitations on
war preparations. The British government acknowledged that military
modernization and mechanization were an expensive but necessary
undertaking, forcing the Cabinet to invest £1,650 million to rearm
the Army, Navy and Air force over a five-year period (1937–41). Even
this sum stretched the resources of the Treasury and the chancellor of
51 Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, ‘Imperial defence policy’, 23 February 1932,
PRO, CAB 53/22.
52 ‘Report by the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee’, 28 February 1934, PRO,
CAB 24/247.
53 Postan, M.M. (1952). British war production, History of the Second World War, United
Kingdom civil series, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, p. 12.
54 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, ‘The organization of the army
for its role in war’, 10 February 1938, PRO, CAB 24/274.
55 Barnett, C. (1972), The collapse of British power, Eyre Methuen Ltd., London,
pp. 502–03; Postan, British war production, p. 33.
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the exchequer concluded that the costs of rearmament ‘not only placed
a terrible strain on the national finances, but could not be increased
without financial disorganization to an extent that would weaken the
resistance of the country’.56
By April 1939Nazi advances in Europe had forced Cabinet members
to recognize the inescapability of war. They enacted emergency
measures to build up the Army, passing the Compulsory Training
Act and doubling the size of the Territorial Army to 26 divisions. The
regular Army still was ‘short of establishment’ by 19,000 men and
Hore-Belisha hoped to enlist 100,000 men to make up for deficits
throughout the forces; the chancellor of the exchequer informed
him, however, that the cost of this policy ‘was more than we could
possibly bear’.57 While the British struggled to field an army, the
Dominions could only offer limited support. Like Great Britain,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa had resisted
the idea of a second global conflict and their armed forces were
consequently underprepared. Together, the four Dominions could
offer only approximately 170,000 men to the Allied cause, most of
whom belonged to reserves and local militias rather than regular
armies.58 Lacking alternatives, the British turned to the Indian Army
to bulk up their own strained forces and to counter weaknesses
prevailing throughout the empire.
The Garran Tribunal had provided soldiers for imperial policing, but
in the face of the growing German threat in Europe, the Indian Army
offerings were pitiful. While British planners looked to the Indian
Army to subsidize their weak forces, it could not readily provide the
required aid. The significant decrease in the Army’s size and funding
after the First World War had compounded generally weak economic
circumstances in India to stunt most modernization efforts. While
some mechanization had occurred before the 1936–37 revolt on the
North-West Frontier, by 1937–38 the Indian Army reputedly was
56 Cabinet conclusions, 16 February 1938, PRO, CAB 23/92; see also Kennedy,
P.M. (1981). The realities behind diplomacy: Background influences on British external policy
1865–1980, Allen & Unwin, London, especially pp. 234–35.
57 Barnett, Britain and her army, p. 420; Cabinet conclusions, 5 April 1939, PRO,
CAB 23/98.
58 Jackson, A. (2006). The British Empire and the Second World War, Hambledon
Continuum, London, pp. 64, 241, 477; (1966). ‘Defence—Armed Services: Army,
New Zealand’, in McLintock, A.H. An encyclopaedia of New Zealand, p. 5, Te Ara: The
Encyclopaedia of New Zealand: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/1966/defence-armed-
services-army-new-zealand>, [accessed 21 May 2013].
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still inferior to Egyptian and Iranian fighting forces—and entirely
incapable of engaging a power like Germany.59
Nevertheless, officials recognized the shifting international
responsibilities of the Indian Army. In February 1938 the secretary to
the government of India wrote to the secretary for the India Office’s
Military Department:
At the time of the publication of the Garran Report the international situation
was very different from that now obtaining. Italy had not conquered Abyssinia;
she was not threatening our position in the Mediterranean, nor had she
attempted, as she is now doing, to establish her influence in Afghanistan.
[. . .] It is impossible to ignore the fact that India is likely, in the future,
to be called upon to accept wider overseas commitments in the interests of
Imperial Defence.60
London policy makers shared this opinion. A new 1937 Defence of
India Plan required the Indian Army to prepare military formations
for deployment abroad, including two infantry battalions: one each
for Egypt and Hong Kong and one each for Burma, Singapore, and
Iraq.61 Officials recognized that the subcontinent could not afford
the requisite mechanization, while Indian political opinion would
not accept additional military spending, particularly when prominent
Indian politicians decried British control of the defence budget and
the costs of continued frontier operations. Constitutional changes
undertaken by the 1935 Government of India Act further limited
India’s central budget.62 In 1938, as the government of India struggled
to balance its budget, the viceroy noted that ‘it must not be forgotten
that the Central Budget has already had to find nine crores of rupees
a year to meet [the] cost of new Constitution arrangements and that
it is inescapably faced with a further seven crores of rupees a year.
In relation to the size of our budget, 16 crores of rupees a year is
equivalent to £200,000,000 a year in England’.63 When asked by
British Cabinet members about the expansion of India’s armed forces,
government of India officials stated they already had encountered
financial and political problems because of ‘improved conditions of
59 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 138.
60 Letter from Secretary, Government of India, to Secretary, India Office, Military
Department, 9 February 1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.
61 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 138.
62 Thomas, P.J. (1939). The growth of federal finance in India: Being a survey of India’s
public finances from 1833 to 1939, Oxford University Press, Madras, p. 424.
63 Telegram from the Viceroy, 24 August 1938, IOR, L/WS/1/150.
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the British soldier at a time when public opinion in India thought that
the British soldier already cost too much’.64
Regardless, changing international circumstances necessitated a
new British military strategy and thus ‘the question [arose] whether
the existing distribution of the Imperial Forces overseas, including
India, [was] the most suitable under modern conditions’.65 Desperate
for aid and recognizing they had little alternative, Cabinet members
agreed to subsidize the Indian Army’s modernization in return for
an expansion of the imperial reserve. The War Office’s annual
contribution of £1.5 million would increase to £2 million and the
Treasury would provide the bulk of £5 million for the imperial
reserve’s modernization and £3 million to re-equip the Royal Air
Force in India. In return the government of India agreed to release
four British infantry battalions for deployment elsewhere and to
maintain a ready reserve of three British and seven Indian infantry
battalions.66 Even this suggestion met with resistance in India. While
the viceroy acknowledged the removal of four British battalions would
ease the defence budget, he criticized Whitehall for refusing to pay
for the imperial reserve’s upkeep, noting Britain’s contribution would
still fall short of modernization costs.67 All of these discussions and
negotiations ultimately resulted not only in increased funding but also
in the establishment of an expert committee that would travel to India
to evaluate the economics, politics, and responsibilities of the Indian
Army, seeking a fiscal compromise and a restructuring of the Army’s
imperial and local duties.
The Expert Committee on Indian Defence: redefining the
frontier in imperial strategy
Although the Expert Committee on Indian Defence shifted India’s
strategic priorities towards the defence of the greater British empire,
it could not disregard the North-West Frontier. On a practical level,
the Committee had little immediate influence on frontier operations,
as the Second World War broke out before its recommendations
64 Cabinet conclusions, 20 July 1938, PRO, CAB 23/94.
65 Letter to S.H. Phillips from S.K. Brown, 2 June 1938, IOR, L/WS/1/150.
66 Note by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, ‘India. Defence questions’,
29 July 1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.
67 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 3 August 1938, IOR,
L/WS/1/150.
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could be enacted and ongoing regional conflict necessitated a
continued military presence. Its final report, nevertheless, had major
implications for the development of the Indian Army everywhere as it
reinforced the necessity of modernization to prevent the Axis powers
from overpowering India or the empire.
A Committee of Imperial Defence sub-committee, which
immediately preceded the Expert Committee on Indian Defence,
presenting its findings on 12 May 1938. Chaired by Major-General
H.R. Pownall, himself a veteran of the North-West Frontier, this
Committee evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of India’s
Army, the supporting air squadrons, and the military’s changing
responsibilities. Pownall viewed the North-West Frontier as the
primary threat to Indian security, requiring troops for ‘defence against
external aggression’ as well as ‘control of the tribes’.68 Otherwise,
India’s security depended on the preservation of its communications
with Britain and imperial outposts, and maintenance of internal peace.
The Committee advocated an extension of Indian military duties
beyond the subcontinent; Pownall noted that the Royal Navy was too
overstretched to patrol communication lines in the Mediterranean
and around Singapore or to protect India’s port cities, leaving India
responsible for these regions. Similarly, the British Army could not
maintain its hold in Palestine and the Middle East, where battalions
were ‘too weak for the proper performance of their important tasks’.69
Thus, while Pownall recognized continued risks on the North-West
Frontier, he emphasized the need for deploying the Indian Army
elsewhere. He noted that the traditional Russian and Afghan threats
to the North-West Frontier had diminished, though ‘the danger may
prove to be only latent and may reassume serious proportions as the
result of adverse factors’, while ‘the history of the North-West Frontier
during the last five years shows that the tribal problems are still urgent
and continuous’.70 But the Committee concerned itself primarily with
more indirect threats to India. It focused on the strategic importance
of Egypt and Aden in the Middle East, and Burma, Singapore, and
Hong Kong in the Far East, and Britain’s tenuous hold in both regions.
Pownall consequently identified India as ‘the most suitable area East
68 ‘A report of a sub-committee on the defence problems of India and the
composition and organization of the army and Royal Air Force in India’, 12 May
1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.
69 Ibid.
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of the Mediterranean in which to station reserves for the Middle and
Far East’ and he called for the commitment of five infantry brigades,
four infantry battalions, and 12 air squadrons for imperial defence.
The Committee recognized that India could immediately supply only
three infantry brigades and one infantry battalion, plus the four British
battalions it had already sent abroad, and consequently requested the
Committee of Imperial Defence to subsidize the Army’s expansion. 71
Pownall also revised India’s existing defence plans for the North-
West Frontier. Recognizing the likelihood of a world war, the
government of India’s General Staff proposed limiting military action
on the frontier. In a worst-case scenario—in which Great Britain
and Afghanistan were at war with simultaneous widespread tribal
disturbances—the General Staff suggested the adoption of primarily
defensive tactics with only small, local offensives.72 The Pownall
Committee decried this proposal, concluding ‘[t]he adoption of such a
policy, though sufficient to secure the administered districts of India
against hostile invasion, would not bring the Afghan government to
terms acceptable to ourselves’ and advocated the use of four bomber
squadrons to support ground forces.73 It also upheld that, despite
global conflict, the number of regular Army forces stationed in the
frontier could not decrease. In an appendix to his report, Pownall
noted:
Apart from it being essential to localise disturbances from the outset, the
nature of the country and the paucity and vulnerability of communications
render the dispersion of the Covering Troops unavoidable. [. . .] In fact, the
events of the past year in Waziristan have shown that the Covering Troops
alone cannot be relied upon in all circumstances to carry out their task and
may have to be reinforced to a considerable extent by formations of the Field
Army.74
Despite the India Office’s proposal for reducing frontier operations,
the Pownall Committee believed that maintaining soldiers in the
region was necessary from a collective security standpoint: ‘[i]f the
Covering Troops were not in sufficient strength and suitably placed
to meet hostile incursions and to deal promptly with tribal outbreaks,
a really dangerous situation would be likely to arise’.75 Irrespective
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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of policy debates within India, the Pownall Committee embraced a
forward policy for the North-West Frontier.
The Expert Committee on Indian Defence, which completed
its report on 30 January 1939, placed the Indian Army in the
greater context of national and international political and military
circumstances. Headed by the admiral of the fleet, Lord Chatfield,
the Committee also included Air Marshal C.L. Courtney, Lieutenant-
General Sir B.N. Sergison-Brooke, and Major-General Sir Claude
Auchinleck, who had risen to military fame fighting the Mahsud
Wazirs on the North-West Frontier earlier in the 1930s.76 The
Committee initially met in London in October 1938 before travelling
to India where it visited New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and the
North-West Frontier.77 Like the Pownall Committee, the Chatfield
Committee was charged with suggesting measures for modernizing
India’s armed forces and balancing local and imperial defence needs.
Unlike the Committee of Imperial Defence sub-committee, the
Expert Committee recognized political constraints on the Indian
Army’s growth. Committee members tried to meet with prominent
Indian politicians to ascertain popular views on military expenditure,
but both Muslim League and Congress members refused, one
Congress leader bluntly asserting ‘he felt no useful purpose would be
served by presenting himself as a witness’.78 Those ‘Hindu’ politicians
who gave evidence reiterated their belief that ‘the forces maintained
and paid for by India should contain no margin available for use in
what are regarded as Imperial, as distinct from Indian, interests’, while
so-called ‘Muslim’ leaders exhibited less opposition.79 Recognizing
India’s move towards independence, the Committee noted that if a
Hindu majority came to power (most likely referring to the Congress),
it would drastically change military policy since defence strategy
and expenditure would leave British hands for the first time. The
Committee believed that Muslims would oppose Hindu demands for
the ‘formation of an army on a “national” basis [. . . because] its
purpose appears to be to counteract the relatively high proportions
76 See Warner, P. (1981). Auchinleck: The lonely soldier, Buchan & Enright, London.
77 ‘Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39’, 30 January
1939, PRO, CAB 24/287.
78 Decypher of telegram from Government of India, Defence Department, to
Secretary of State for India, 2 December 1938, IOR, L/WS/1/154.
79 Ibid. The Report did not make distinctions between Indian political parties such
as the Congress or the Muslim League, instead making generalizations about public
opinion based on religious divisions.
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of Muslims in the Army as it exists to-day’.80 Because Indian defence
decisions remained with the British under the 1935 Government of
India Act, the Chatfield Committee had few immediate worries about
the impact of nationalist politics on the Indian Army, though growing
tensions between the Congress and Muslim League foreshadowed
debates that would emerge with the viceroy’s declaration of war on
Germany.
To improve the military’s ability to meet India’s internal and
external defence needs, the Chatfield Committee recommended the
complete modernization and reorganization of the Indian Army,
totalling three British cavalry regiments, 15 Indian cavalry regiments,
37British infantry regiments, and82 Indian infantry battalions. These
forces comprised four categories: ‘frontier defence troops’, ‘internal
security troops’, ‘coast defence troops’, and a ‘general reserve’.81
Modernization efforts would eliminate 16 infantry battalions and
four cavalry regiments, which would be shifted to British control,
absorbed into mechanized battalions and regiments or altogether
eliminated, ultimately lowering the Indian Army’s costs. The British
Army, in turn, would receive a field artillery regiment, three horse
artillery batteries, and one medium artillery regiment in addition to
the infantry battalions moved to British command under previous
agreements.82 The Chatfield Committee further advocated building
up war industries in India to make the subcontinent self-sufficient and
coordinating defence planning between Britain and India.83
The Expert Committee recommended radical policy changes in
addressing troop deployment for local versus imperial defence. It
refuted earlier distinctions between the imperial reserve and the
greater Indian Army, arguing ‘India should acknowledge that her
responsibility cannot in her own interests be safely limited to the
local defence of her land frontiers and coasts’.84 This shift destroyed
the traditional divide between British and Indian spending on the
Indian Army. Instead of requiring Britain to pay for Indian forces
deployed abroad, the Expert Committee believed the government of
India should bear the brunt of India’s ‘external security’ costs. To
80 Ibid.
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lessen the shock of this policy shift, the Chatfield Committee proposed
that Britain should undertake the substantial costs of modernizing
the Indian Army, Air force, and Navy. Working with the Defence
Department, the Expert Committee calculated that modernization
over a five-year period would cost £34.33 million in net capital. The
Committee concluded that the British government should give India
a grant as well as loan additional funds, ‘the service of which might,
in view of India’s immediate financial difficulties, be postponed until
modernization had been completed’.85
In considering local threats to the subcontinent, the Chatfield
Committee followed in the footsteps of countless other planners,
identifying the North-West Frontier as the subcontinent’s major
weakness. The Committee recognized that Afghanistan did not
present an immediate threat to India, despite the presence of Axis
legations and propaganda in the country but it also argued that
circumstances could easily change, particularly given the weak Afghan
regime. Chatfield concluded ‘that India’s defence plans must provide
for the contingency of Afghan aggression against India, coupled with
the certainty of widespread tribal disturbances, and the possibility of
assistance by a Great Power or Powers which might assume serious
proportions’, though he emphasized that India’s security interests
extended beyond the frontier as well.86
The Committee carefully analysed the government of India’s policy
towards the tribal area. In gathering evidence, the Expert Committee
interviewed military officials like Brigadier-General Thomas Corbett
who informed it that ‘second only to political conditions and complexes
within was the influence of the North West Frontier tribes on the
Army of India. They constituted the most elusive and dominant factor
in India’s defence problems. They absorbed much of India’s defence
resources. They were a constant drain and a source of danger liable
to flare up at the most awkward times.’87 However, the Committee
85 Ibid.
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arrived at no definite conclusions, recognizing the diversity of opinion
about frontier policy:
The evidence, in fact, embraced every shade of opinion, ranging from those
who were prepared in the main to accept the present state of affairs, through
those who advocated changes of method—some slight, some substantial
and some entirely radical—to one or two who even favoured a complete
abandonment of the Forward Policy because its proper application within any
reasonable time was, in their view, impracticable on account of the prohibitive
cost and the diplomatic difficulties it would create with Afghanistan.88
The Committee criticized the government for lacking set
measures for maintaining a forward policy or gauging its success,
and it entertained the possibility of withdrawing troops from
the frontier and quelling tribal unrest by economic and social
means. However, Chatfield ultimately concluded that policy needed
further consideration, which the viceroy addressed through his
aforementioned, similarly inconclusive, June 1939 memorandum.
Militarily, the Committee questioned the continued presence of
regular troops on the frontier, citing the drains of frontier service on
the defence forces and budget, though it provided no alternatives.
It did, however, laud the use of the Air force on the frontier,
advocating air action to limit ground operations, though firmly
rebuffing suggestions for unrestricted deployment, which could ‘give
rise to allegations of inhumanity, however unjustified’.89 A large
number of troops would remain garrisoned in the region; the
Committee calculated that in Waziristan alone, unrest might require
one district headquarters, one striking force headquarters, five brigade
headquarters, one Indian cavalry armoured regiment, two troops of
field artillery, one medium artillery battery, seven mountain artillery
batteries, three field companies of sappers and miners, three British
infantry battalions, 20 Indian infantry battalions, and one Indian
states forces infantry battalion.90 The constant threat of unrest
fostered either by tribes or a foreign power meant the region still
drained India’s defence resources, despite efforts to economize or
limit offensive action.
Before the recommendations of the Chatfield Committee could
be enacted, war broke out in Europe and the spread of the conflict
88 ‘Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39’, 30 January
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across the globe meant that India’s own security became deeply
intertwined with the imperial war effort. The Chatfield Committee
had concluded that deploying Indian troops abroad would best ensure
the subcontinent’s defences, and military planning early in the
war implemented security measures for India accordingly. General
Archibald Wavell’s campaigns against the Axis powers in North Africa
and the Middle East demanded Indian troops soon after war broke
out and throughout 1940–42, particularly when Field-Marshal Erwin
Rommel began his counteroffensive against the British. As early as
September 1939 the 11th and 5th Indian Infantry Brigades and a
Divisional Headquarters had already left for Egypt.91 The Middle East
campaigns drained the subcontinent of trained, equipped manpower,
though the government of India demanded that ‘adequate forces’
remain for service on the North-West Frontier and in case of internal
unrest.92 Between 1 October 1939 and 1 January 1942 the Indian
Regular Army stationed abroad expanded from 16,315 personnel to
268,327, while in India it increased from 178,058 to 565,238.93
World war succeeded where the Chatfield Committee had failed:
it reconciled the defence of the North-West Frontier with the Indian
Army’s imperial responsibilities. The North-West Frontier emerged
as a potential theatre in the Second World War when the Nazi-Soviet
Non-aggression Pact came to light, forcing strategists hastily to create
contingency plans in case war erupted between the Soviet Union and
Great Britain. These plans specifically involved the frontier military
establishment, the setting of a would-be Soviet assault on India, but
had wider repercussions for British war plans. The government of
India’s Defence Department recognized that if the Soviet Union struck
at the frontier, overseas aid would be impossible because of fighting
in the Middle East and Europe; meanwhile, a lack of experienced
troops and equipment in India—‘the necessity for giving time for our
expansion programme to materialise’ and the ‘increased rapidity of
operations due to mechanised warfare and air supply’—would further
weaken frontier defences.94 India had become the Far Eastern bastion
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of the Middle Eastern war theatre and, as a result, as early as 1939
officials included reviews of policy towards Afghanistan and the North-
West Frontier in Middle Eastern military strategy.95 Moreover, new
tribal unrest on the frontier required vigilance; one serviceman noted:
‘[l]ast week we had 16 more casualties one day, in fact we are losing
more here than the Army is in France!’96 As Britain struggled through
the first three years of war, the viceroy reflected:
As the Middle East and Mediterranean conflict develops, it becomes
progressively clearer that it behoves us to take further stock of our position
on the North-West Frontier and in Afghanistan. The Frontier problem has to
be viewed against the perspective of India’s role as a political and strategic
base for strengthening resistance to German (and possibly Russian) inroads
on the whole range of Middle East Powers, of which Afghanistan and the
North-West Frontier form, as it were, the Eastern buttress.97
Despite criticism expressed by the Chatfield Committee about the
North-West Frontier’s demands on India’s military resources, the
subcontinent’s defence plans affirmed a forward policy for the North-
West Frontier in the first three years of war as a means not only to
prevent tribal unrest from undermining Afghanistan or the war effort
abroad, but also to maintain the region as the local platform for any
operations needed to thwart foreign aggression towards Afghanistan
or even India itself. Maintaining peace on the frontier gained even
greater significance as military planners feared that a resurgence
of tribal violence would distract the subcontinent from the imperial
war effort. The incorporation of the North-West Frontier in British
military strategy for the Middle East necessitated troop deployment on
India’s borderlands. As late as July 1942, after the War had extended
into the Pacific, with the fall of Singapore and Burma’s occupation
by the Japanese, the British deployed two Indian infantry brigades,
two infantry battalions, two mountain regiments, two squadrons of
the Royal Air Force, and two squadrons of the Indian Air Force to
counteract a tribal insurgence in the northwest.98
95 See report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Review of military policy in the
Middle East’, 5 December 1939, PRO, CAB 66/3/48.
96 Letter by H.V. Lewis, 24November 1939, Imperial War Museum, London, Lewis
papers, IWM 74/48/1.
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Mss Eur F125.
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December 1942’, 2August 1943, IOR, L/WS/1/1526; ‘Report for the month of August
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Conclusion
The interwar years saw a prolonged struggle between the governments
in Great Britain and India over the duties of the Indian Army.
This clash mirrored debates occurring within the empire as Britain
sought military forces to serve throughout its holdings. Britain’s own
demobilization—largely impelled by the country’s financial straits and
public opposition to a large military—meant that Britain’s army was
incapable of taking on all of the empire’s policing, particularly as it
faced new unrest in the Middle East and the growing threat of war
in Europe. Thus, unable and unwilling to muster an appropriate force
at home, Britain reached out to its imperial subjects for help. Britain
supported the creation of a small Iraqi Army, turned colonial African
battalions into field units, and established a Middle East Reserve
Brigade to subdue local unrest and combat advancing European
forces.99 As Britain realized how ill prepared it was to face Germany,
while maintaining peace in the empire, it turned again to India for
military support.
Despite its willing participation in the Allied military effort during
the Great War, the Indian government was determined to retrench
at the end of the War, reducing its swollen defence budget and military
to a force responsible primarily for the security of the subcontinent.
The British government, in contrast, adamantly maintained that
the Indian Army should continue to participate in imperial defence
and serve throughout an empire that was larger than ever. In the
debates that ensued, the government of India succeeded in obtaining
British agreement that the Indian Army’s main responsibility was
the subcontinent. While Britain accepted this arrangement during
the 1920s, it demanded alternative agreements as another world war
drew near.
British administrators made a series of agreements with the
government of India in the 1930s that extended its imperial military
responsibilities. However, the age-old debate over army finance again
prevented the widespread deployment of Indian soldiers. Renewed
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(undated) September 1942, PRO, CAB 68/9/43.
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violence on India’s North-West Frontier, moreover, occupied tens of
thousands of soldiers who otherwise could have served abroad. As the
frontier conflict threatened to grow even after a wide-scale 1936–37
revolt, India was in danger of needing fresh soldiers on its own borders
rather allowing them to police the empire. The British, desperate to
fortify their pitiful armed forces, ultimately went so far as to finance
the complete modernization of the Indian Army in return for an
expanded imperial fighting force.
Chatfield’s Expert Committee on the Defence of India marked
the most distinct shift in interwar Indian military policy. While
it built on decisions made by earlier commissions like the Garran
Tribunal, the Expert Committee was the first to oppose totally the
subcontinent’s unconditional focus on local defence; instead, Chatfield
made imperial security the top priority of the Indian Army, requiring
a vast new force to serve abroad. Perhaps more importantly, the
Chatfield Commission succeeded in gaining approval in India for this
drastic policy change because it required Great Britain, not India,
to pay for the vast majority of modernization and mechanization.
While previous committees, determined to limit Britain’s military
spending at home and abroad, had demanded that India maintain its
forces abroad, the Chatfield Committee recognized that forces used
throughout the empire became the responsibility of Britain. Britain,
moreover, had little choice but to accept as the alternative would have
forced Britain to face Germany and its allies virtually unarmed.
Through the Chatfield Committee’s conclusions, local and imperial
defence strategies blended, and traditional financial and military
divides within the empire came to an end. The threat of world war
was great enough that Britain and India agreed to compromise:
recognizing that the empire’s very survival was in jeopardy, India
agreed to send troops abroad while Britain agreed to finance them.
The governments in Delhi and London overcame opposition—from
nationalists in India and financial advisers in Britain—to provide the
empire with vital manpower.
Though acceptance of the Chatfield Committee’s recommendations
initiated India’s total participation in the imperial war effort,
leading the viceroy to go to war with Germany shortly after Great
Britain’s own declaration, it also ultimately helped pave the way
for Indian independence. The nationalist backlash against the war
effort coincided with Britain’s growing reliance on India’s military
and industrial resources, leaving the government of India in a delicate
position as the war progressed. Indian independence immediately
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after the War meant that the provisions of the Chatfield Committee
no longer applied, again removing the subcontinent’s troops from
the imperial garrison and necessitating new negotiations between
Britain, India, and Pakistan about South Asia’s military role in the
Commonwealth. Meanwhile, independent Pakistan faced the same
balancing act as the government of India had done under the Raj:
deploying its army to maintain peace on the North-West Frontier while
facing threats from abroad as well. While the Chatfield Committee
ensured that India took part in the Allied effort during the Second
World War, it provided no lasting principles for the involvement of
the subcontinent in global military affairs in ensuing years.
